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Abstract
The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has produced
many interesting and valuable contributions in computer science under the general umbrella of algorithmic
mechanism design. Novel algorithmic properties and paradigms have been identified and studied in the
literature. Our work stems from the observation that selfishness is different from rationality; agents will
attempt to strategize whenever they perceive it to be convenient according to their imperfect rationality.
Recent work in economics [23] has focused on a particular notion of imperfect rationality, namely absence
of contingent reasoning skills, and defined obvious strategyproofness (OSP) as a way to deal with the
selfishness of these agents. Essentially, this definition states that to care for the incentives of these agents,
we need not only pay attention about the relationship between input and output, but also about the
way the algorithm is run. However, it is not clear to date what algorithmic approaches ought to be used
for OSP. In this paper, we rather surprisingly show that, for binary allocation problems, OSP is fully
captured by a natural combination of two well-known and extensively studied algorithmic techniques:
forward and reverse greedy. We call two-way greedy this underdeveloped algorithmic design paradigm.
Our main technical contribution establishes the connection between OSP and two-way greedy. We
build upon the recently introduced cycle monotonicity technique for OSP [12]. By means of novel
structural properties of cycles and queries of OSP mechanisms, we fully characterize these mechanisms
in terms of extremal implementations. These are protocols that ask each agent to consistently separate
one extreme of their domain at the current history from the rest. Through the natural connection
with the greedy paradigm, we are able to import a host of known approximation bounds to OSP and
strengthen the strategic properties of this family of algorithms. Finally, we begin exploring the full power
of two-way greedy (and, in turns, OSP) in the context of set systems.
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1 Introduction
An established line of work in computer science recognizes the important role played by self interests. If
ignored, these self interests can misguide the algorithm or protocol at hand and lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Mechanism design has emerged as the framework of reference to deal with this selfishness. Mechanisms
are protocols that interact with the selfish agents involved in the computation; the information elicited
through this interaction is used to choose a certain outcome (via an algorithm). The goal of a mechanism
is that of reconciling the potentially contradictory aims of agents with that of the designer (i.e., optimize
a certain objective function). The agents attach a utility (typically defined as quasi-linear function of the
transfers defined by the mechanism and the agent’s type – i.e., cost or valuation – for the solution) to each
outcome and are therefore incentivized to force the output of an outcome that maximizes their utility (rather
than maximizing the objective function). The quality of a mechanism is assessed against how well it can
approximate the objective function whilst giving the right incentives to the agents.
In this context, one seeks to design strategyproof (SP) mechanisms — these guarantee that agents will not
strategize as it will in their best interest to adhere to the rules set by the mechanism— and aims to understand
what is the best possible approximation that can be computed for the setting of interest. For example, it is
known how for utilitarian problems (roughly speaking, those whose objective function is the sum of all the
agents’ types) it is possible to simultaneously achieve optimality and strategyproofness, whilst some non-
utilitarian objective (such as, min-max) cannot be approximated too well (irrespectively of computational
considerations), see, e.g., [27]. These results can be proved purely from an algorithmic perspective – that
ignores incentives and selfishness – in that it is known how strategyproofness is equivalent to a certain
monotonicity property of the algorithm used by the mechanism to compute the outcome. This monotonicity
relates the outcomes of two instances, connected by SP constraints, and limits what the algorithm can do on
them. For example, if an agent is part of the solution computed on instance I and becomes “better” (e.g.,
faster) in instance I ′ then the algorithm must select the agent also in the solution returned for instance I ′,
all other things unchanged.
Recent research in mechanism design has highlighted how cognitive limitations of the agents might mean
that SP is too weak a desideratum for mechanisms. Even for the simplest setting of one-item auction,
there is experimental evidence that people strategize against the sealed-bid implementation of second-price
auction, whilst ascending-price auction seems easier to grasp [4, 18]. The concept of obvious strategyproofness
(OSP) has been defined in [23] to capture this particular form of imperfect rationality, which is shown to be
equivalent to the absence of contingent reasoning skills. Intuitively, for an agent it is obvious to understand
if a strategy is better than another in that the worst possible outcome for the former is better than the best
one for the latter.
Can we, similarly to SP, derive bounds on the quality of OSP mechanisms that are
oblivious to strategic considerations?
There are two obstacles to getting a fully algorithmic approach to OSP mechanisms due to their structure.
Whereas SP mechanisms are pairs comprised of an algorithm and transfer (a.k.a., payment) function, in OSP
we have a third component – the so-called implementation tree – which encapsulates the execution details
(e.g., sealed bid vs ascending price) of the mechanisms and the obviousness of the strategic constraints. (For
OSP, in fact, the implementation details matter and the classical Revelation Principle does not hold [23].)
A technique, known as cycle monotonicity (CMON), allows to express the existence of SP payments for an
algorithm in terms of the weight of the cycles in a suitably defined graph. Specifically, it is known that it
is sufficient to look at cycles of length two for practically all optimization problems of interest [29] — this
yields the aforementioned property of monotone algorithms. Recent work [12, 11] extends CMON to OSP
and allows to focus only on algorithms and implementation trees. Whilst this has allowed some progress
towards settling our main question in the context of single-parameter agents, some unsatisfactory limitations
are still present. Firstly, handling two interconnected objects, namely algorithm and implementation tree,
simultaneously is hard to work with: e.g., novel ad-hoc techniques (dubbed CMON two-ways in [12]) had to
be developed to prove lower bounds. Secondly, the CMON extension to OSP is shown to require the study of
cycles of any length, thus implying that the “monotonicity” of the combination algorithm/implementation
tree needs to hold amongst an arbitrary number of instances, as opposed to two as in the case of SP. Thirdly,
the mechanisms constructed in [12, 11] only work for small domains (of size up to three) since they rely on
the simpler two-instance monotonicity (referred to as monotonicity henceforth).
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Our contributions. The technical challenge left open by previous work was to relate monotonicity to
many-instance monotonicity. In this paper, we solve this challenge by providing a characterization of OSP
mechanisms for binary allocation problems (for which the outcome for each agent is either to be selected
or not). This enables us to show that the shape of the implementation tree is essentially fixed and answer
the question above in the positive. It turns out that the exact algorithmic structure of OSP mechanisms is
intimately linked with a (slight generalization of a) well know textbook paradigm:
OSP can be achieved if and only if the algorithm is two-way greedy.
What does it mean for an algorithm to be two-way greedy? The literature in computer science and approx-
imation algorithms has extensively explored what we call forward greedy. These are algorithms that use a
(possibly adaptive) (in-)priority function and incrementally build up a solution by adding therein the agent
with the highest priority, if this preserves feasibility. It is known that if the priority rule is monotone in each
agent’s type then this leads to a SP direct-revelation mechanism (see, e.g., [22]). What we show here is that
the strategyproofness guarantee is actually much stronger and can deal with imperfect rationality. This is
achieved with a simple implementation of forward greedy that sweeps through each agent’s domain from the
best possible type to the worst. Another relevant approach known in the literature is Deferred Acceptance
auctions (DAAs) or reverse greedy algorithms [9, 16]. These use a (possibly adaptive) (out-)priority func-
tion and build a feasible solution by incrementally throwing out the agents whose type is not good enough
with respect the current priority (i.e., whose cost (valuation) is higher (lower) than the out-priority) until a
feasible solution is found. It is already known that DAAs are OSP [25] but not the extent to which focusing
on them would be detrimental to finding out the real limitations of OSP mechanisms. Two-way greedy
algorithms combine in- and out-priorities ; each agent faces either a greedy in- or out-priority; in the former
case, they are included in the solution if feasibility is preserved while in the latter they are excluded from it if
the current solution is not yet feasible. The direction faced can depend on which agents have been included
in or thrown out from the eventual solution at that point of the execution; in this sense, these are particular
adaptive priority algorithms. For a formal definition, please see Section 4 and Algorithm 3 below.
Two-way greedy algorithms stem from our characterization of OSP mechanisms in terms of “extremal
implementation trees”; roughly speaking, in these mechanisms we always query each agents about (the
same) extreme of their domain at the current history. To prove this characterization, we first give a couple
of structural properties of OSP mechanisms. We specifically show (i) when a query can be made to guarantee
OSP; and, (ii) how a mechanism that is monotone but not many-instance monotone looks like. We use the
former property to show that, given an OSP mechanism, we can modify the structure of its implementation
tree to make it extreme whilst guaranteeing that the many-instance monotonicity is preserved (i.e., the
structure (ii) is not possible). We also show that extremal mechanisms are monotone and that structure (ii)
can never arise, thus proving the sufficient condition of our characterization.1
One caveat about these extremal mechanisms and two-way greedy is necessary. This has to do with a
technical exception to the rule of never interleaving top queries (asking for the maximum of the current
domain) with bottom queries (asking for the minimum) to an agent. An OSP mechanism can in fact
interleave those when, at the current history, an agent becomes revealable, that is, the threshold separating
winning bids from losing ones, becomes known. In other words, this is a point in which the outcome for this
agent (but not necessarily the entire solution) is determined for all but one of her types. OSP mechanisms
can at this point use any query ordering to find out what the type of the agent is; this does not affect the
incentives of the agents. Accordingly, in a two-way greedy algorithm an agent can face changes of priority
direction (e.g., from in- to out-priority) in these circumstances.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first known case of a relationship between strategic properties and
an algorithmic paradigm, as opposed to a property about the solution output by the algorithm. Two possible
interpretations of this connection can be given. On a conceptual level, the fact that the Revelation Principle
does not hold true for OSP means that we care about the implementation details and therefore the right
algorithmic nature has to be paradigmatic rather than being only about the final output. On a technical
level, given that monotonicity (i.e., two-cycles) is not sufficient for OSP, the need to study many-instance
monotonicity (i.e., any cycle) requires to go beyond an output property and look for the way in which the
algorithm computes any solution.
1Interestingly, property (ii) proves why for domains of size up to three, it is possible to freely interleave queries as in [12, 11]
since it shows that four types are necessary for the two-instance monotonicity to become insufficient (and only necessary).
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It is worth noticing that our OSP characterization is related to the Personal Clock Auctions (PCAs)
in [23]. Li proves that for binary allocation problems and continuous domains, each agent faces either an
ascending-price auction (where there is an increasing transfer going rate to be included in the solution) or a
descending-price auction (where there is a decreasing transfer going rate to be excluded from the solution).
Our result complements Li’s along two dimensions. Firstly, it generalizes the characterization to the case
of finite domains. This is arguably more interesting for OSP, as it is notoriously harder to understand how
to execute extensive-form games in the continuous case. Moreover, our proof does not rely on the existence
of a unique threshold (in the case of discrete domains, there are two values that satisfy this definition, i.e.,
extreme winning and losing reports do not “meet” in the limit). Secondly, our approach and terminology
are closer to computer science and algorithms and give a specific recipe to reason about design and analysis
of these mechanisms. For example, it is not clear how to precisely define the transfer going rates in PCAs
and how this relates to the quality of their algorithmic outcome.
We give a host of bounds on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms by relying on our char-
acterization and the known approximation guarantees of forward greedy algorithms, cf. Table 2 below. The
strategic equivalence of forward and reverse greedy is one of the most far reaching consequences of our re-
sults, given (i) the rich literature on the approximation of forward greedy, and (ii) the misconception about
the apparent weaknesses of accepting, rather than rejecting, auctions [25] (see Section 4 and Appendix B for
details). We expect our work to spawn further research about OSP, having fully extracted the algorithmic
nature of these mechanisms. The power and limitations of OSP can now be fully explored, in the context of
binary allocation problems. We present some initial bounds on the quality of these algorithms/mechanisms
(see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Notably, we close the gap for the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms
for the so-called knapsack auctions, studied in [9]. We show that the logarithmic upper bound provided
by the authors is basically tight not just for reverse greedy (as shown by them) but for the whole class of
two-way greedy/OSP.
Since our main objective is that of establishing the power of OSP, in terms of algorithmic tools and
their approximation, we do not primarily focus on the computational complexity of these mechanisms.
Consequently, our lower bounds are unconditional. We discuss this aspect and more opportunities for further
research in the conclusions (see Section 5). A discussion on more related work can be found in Appendix C.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
For the design of a mechanism, we need to define a set N of n selfish agents and a set of feasible outcomes S.
Each agent i has a type ti ∈ Di, where Di is the domain of i. The type ti is assumed to be private knowledge
of agent i. We let ti(X) ∈ R denote the cost of agent i with type ti for the outcome X ∈ S. When costs are
negative, it means that the agent has a profit from the solution, called valuation.
A mechanism has to select an outcome X ∈ S. For this reason, the mechanism interacts with agents.
Specifically, agent i takes actions (e.g., saying yes/no) that may depend on her presumed type bi ∈ Di (e.g.,
saying yes could “signal” that the presumed type has some properties that bi enjoys). To stress this we
say that agent i takes actions compatible with (or according to) bi. Note that the presumed type bi can be
different from the real type ti.
For a mechanism M , we let M(b) denote the outcome returned by the mechanism when agents take
actions according to their presumed types b = (b1, . . . , bn) (i.e., each agent i takes actions compatible with
the corresponding bi). This outcome is given by a pair (f, p), where f = f(b) = (f1(b), . . . , fn(b)) (termed
social choice function or, simply, algorithm) maps the actions taken by the agents according to b to a feasible
solution in S, and p = p(b) = (p1(b), . . . , pn(b)) ∈ Rn maps the actions taken by the agents according to b
to payments. Note that payments need not be positive.
Each selfish agent i is equipped with a quasi-linear utility function ui : Di×S → R: for ti ∈ Di and for an
outcome X ∈ S returned by a mechanism M , ui(ti, X) is the utility that agent i has for the implementation
of outcome X when her type is ti, i.e., ui(ti,M(bi,b−i)) = pi(bi,b−i)− ti(f(bi,b−i)).
In this work we will focus on single-parameter settings, that is, the case in which the private information
of each bidder i is a single real number ti and ti(X) can be expressed as tiwi(X) for some publicly known
function wi. To simplify the notation, we will write tifi(b) when we want to express the cost of a single-
parameter agent i of type ti for the output of social choice function f on input the actions corresponding
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to a bid vector b. In particular, we will consider binary allocation problems, where fi(b) ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., each
agent either belongs to the returned solution (fi(b) = 1) or not (fi(b) = 0). A class of binary allocation
problems of interest are set systems (E,F), where E is a set of elements and F ⊆ 2E is a family of feasible
subsets of E. Each element i ∈ E is controlled by a selfish agent, that is, the cost for including i is known
only to agent i and is equal to some value ti. The social choice function f must choose a feasible subset of
elements X in F that minimizes ∑ni=1 bi(X). When the ti’s are non-negative (non-positive, respectively)
then this objective is called social cost minimization (social welfare maximization, respectively).
2.1 Extensive-form Mechanisms and Obvious Strategyproofness
We now introduce the concept of implementation tree and we formally define (deterministic) obviously
strategy-proof mechanisms. Our definition is built on [24] rather than the original definition in [23]. Specifi-
cally, our notion of implementation tree is equivalent to the concept of round-table mechanisms in [24], and
our definition of OSP is equivalent to the concept of SP-implementation through a round table mechanism,
that is proved to be equivalent to the original definition of OSP.
Let us first formally model how a mechanism works. An extensive-form mechanism M is a triple (f, p, T )
where, as above, the pair (f, p) determines the outcome of the mechanism, and T is a tree, called implemen-
tation tree, such that:
• Every leaf ℓ of the tree is labeled with a possible outcome of the mechanism (X(ℓ), p(ℓ)), where X(ℓ) ∈ S
and p(ℓ) ∈ R;
• Each node u in the implementation tree T defines the following:
– An agent i = i(u) to whom the mechanism makes some query. Each possible answer to this query
leads to a different child of u.
– A subdomain D(u) = (D
(u)
i , D
(u)
−i ) containing all types that are compatible with u, i.e., with all the
answers to the queries from the root down to node u. Specifically, the query at node u defines a
partition of the current domain of i, D
(u)
i into k ≥ 2 subdomains, one for each of the k children of
node u. Thus, the domain of each of these children will have as the domain of i, the subdomain of
D
(u)
i corresponding to a different answer of i at u, and an unchanged domain for the other agents.
Observe that, according to the definition above, for every profile b there is only one leaf ℓ = ℓ(b) such
that b belongs to D(ℓ). Similarly, to each leaf ℓ there is at least a profile b that belongs to D(ℓ). For this
reason, we say that M(b) = (X(ℓ), p(ℓ)).
Two profiles b, b′ are said to diverge at a node u of T if this node has two children v, v′ such that
b ∈ D(v), whereas b′ ∈ D(v′). For every such node u, we say that i(u) is the divergent agent at u.
We are now ready to define obvious strategyproofness. An extensive-form mechanism M is obviously
strategy-proof (OSP) if for every agent i with real type ti, for every vertex u such that i = i(u), for every
b−i,b′−i (with b
′
−i not necessarily different from b−i), and for every bi ∈ Di, with bi 6= ti, such that (ti,b−i)
and (bi,b
′
−i) are compatible with u, but diverge at u, it holds that
ui(ti,M(ti,b−i)) ≥ ui(ti,M(bi,b′−i)).
Roughly speaking, an obviously strategy-proof mechanism requires that, at each time step agent i is asked
to take a decision that depends on her type, the worst utility that she can get if she behaves according to
her true type is at least the best utility she can get by behaving differently. We stress that our definition
does not restrict the alternative behavior to be consistent with a fixed type. Indeed, as noted above, each
leaf of the tree rooted in u, denoted Tu, corresponds to a profile b = (bi,b′−i) compatible with u: then, our
definition implies that the utility of i in the leaves where she plays truthfully is at least as much as the utility
in every other leaf of Tu.
2.2 Cycle-monotonicity Characterizes OSP Mechanisms
We next describe the main tools in [12] showing that OSP can be characterized by the absence of negative-
weight cycles in a suitable weighted graph over the possible strategy profiles. For ease of exposition, we
will focus on non-negative costs but the results hold no matter the sign. We consider a mechanism M with
implementation tree T for a social choice function f , and define the following concepts:
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• Separating Node: A node u in the implementation tree T is (a,b)-separating for agent i = i(u) if a
and b are compatible with u (that is, a,b ∈ D(u)), and the two types ai and bi belong to two different
subdomains of the children of u (thus implying ai 6= bi).
• OSP-graph: For every agent i, we define a directed weighted graph OTi having a node for each profile
in D = ×iDi. The graph contains edge (a,b) if and only if T has some node u which is (a,b)-separating
for i = i(u), and the weight of this edge is w(a,b) = ai(fi(b) − fi(a)). Throughout the paper, we will
denote with a→ b an edge (a,b) ∈ OTi , and with a b a path among these two profiles in OTi .
• OSP Cycle Monotonicity (OSP CMON): We say that the OSP cycle monotonicity (OSP CMON)
holds if, for all i, the graph OTi does not contain negative-weight cycles. Moreover, we say that the OSP
two-cycle monotonicity (OSP 2CMON) holds if the same is true when considering cycles of length two
only, i.e., cycles with only two edges.
Theorem 1 ([12]). A mechanism with implementation tree T for a social function f is OSP on finite
domains if and only if OSP CMON holds.
Given the theorem above, we henceforth assume that the agents have finite domains.
3 A Characterization of OSP Mechanisms
In this section we present our characterization of OSP mechanisms for binary allocation problems.
3.1 Setting the Scene
It is useful to focus on the possible weights of single edges as well as on two-cycles, in the case of binary
allocation problems.
Observation 1 (Basic Properties of the OSP-graph). The weight of an edge is non-zero only for a:
• positive-weight edge, i.e., fi(a) = 0 and fi(b) = 1, in which case the weight is w(a,b) = +ai;
• negative-weight edge, i.e., fi(a) = 1 and fi(b) = 0, in which case the weight is w(a,b) = −ai.
If OSP 2CMON holds, then (i) for every positive-weight edge as above, we have bi < ai and, by symmetry,
(ii) for every negative-weight edge as above, we have ai < bi. Note that these inequalities are strict since
ai 6= bi for every edge as above.
The following notation will also be used throughout our proofs.
Definition 1 (0-always, 1-always, unclear). For sel ∈ {0, 1}, indicating whether i is selected, and for a
generic type ti ∈ D(u)i , for a node u of the implementation tree, we define the following:
• Type ti is sel-always if fi(t) = sel for all t−i ∈ D(u)−i ;
• Type ti is sel-sometime if fi(t) = sel for some t−i ∈ D(u)−i .
Moreover, type ti is unclear if it is neither 0-always nor 1-always, that is, it is both 0-sometime and
1-sometime.
We next give three structural properties of OSP mechanisms that will be useful.
Structure of the Implementation Tree. We first observe that, without loss of generality, we can always
assume that each node u in the implementation tree has two children, and thus the mechanism partitions
D
(u)
i into two subdomains L
(u) and R(u).
Observation 2. For any OSP mechanism M = (f, p, T ) where T is not a binary tree, there is an OSP
mechanism M ′ = (f, p, T ′) where T ′ is a binary tree.
We refer the interested reader to Appendix A.1 for a proof of Observation 2.
We stress that, in general, the two parts L(u) and R(u) can be any partition of the subdomain D
(u)
i , and
they are not necessarily ordered. For example, if D
(u)
i = {1, 2, 5, 6, 7}, a query “is your type even?” results
in L(u) = {1, 5, 7} and R(u) = {2, 6}, with these two subdomains being “incomparable”. However, we will
see that in an OSP mechanism these sets L(u) and R(u) share a special structure.
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Structure of Admissible Queries. We begin with a simple observation about the structure of the parts
implied by a simple application of OSP 2CMON.
Observation 3. If OSP 2CMON holds and at every node u where the subdomain is separated into two parts
L and R the following holds. Every 0-sometime element l in one side (say L) implies that all elements in
the other side that are bigger (r ∈ R with r > l) must be 0-always. Similarly, every 1-sometime element l
in one side (say L) implies that all elements in the other side that are smaller (r ∈ R with r < l) must be
1-always.
Next lemma characterizes the admissible queries in OSP mechanisms.
Lemma 1 (Admissible Queries). Let M be an OSP mechanism with implementation tree T and let u be
a node of T where the query separates the current subdomain into two parts L and R. Then one of the
following conditions must hold:
1. At least one of the two parts, some P ∈ {L,R}, is homogeneous meaning that
P = {p1 < p2 < · · · < p|P |︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-always
} or P = {p1 < p2 < · · · < p|P |︸ ︷︷ ︸
0-always
}
2. Agent i is revealable at node u, meaning that the subdomain D
(u)
i has the following structure:
D
(u)
i = {d1 < d2 < · · · < da︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-always
< d∗ < d′1 < d
′
2 < · · · d′b︸ ︷︷ ︸
0-always
} (1)
where each subset of 1-always and 0-always types may be empty, and d∗ may or may not be 1-always
or 0-always. Moreover, the two parts that are separated must have the following structure:
L = {l1 < l2 < · · · < la︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-always
< l∗ < l′1 < l
′
2 · · · < l′b︸ ︷︷ ︸
0-always
} , (2)
R = {r1 < r2 < · · · < rc︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-always
< r∗ < r′1 < r
′
2 · · · < r′d︸ ︷︷ ︸
0-always
} , (3)
where at most one between l∗ and r∗ is unclear (neither 0-always nor 1-always).
Proof. We show that, if neither L nor R is homogeneous, then they must satisfy (2) and (3). Using OSP
2CMON (Observation 3), we can show that L must have the following structure (the symmetric argument
applies to R):
L = {l1 < l2 < · · · < la︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-always
< l′1 < l
′
2 < · · · < l′a︸ ︷︷ ︸
1-sometime
< l′′1 < l
′′
2 < · · · < l′′a︸ ︷︷ ︸
0-sometime
< l′′′1 < l
′′′
2 · · · < l′′′b︸ ︷︷ ︸
0-always
} ,
where each of these four subsets may be empty. Since R is not homogeneous, there are two profiles r0, r1 with
fi(r
1) = 1 and fi(r
0) = 0. We next show that L must contain at most one unclear type l∗, hence (2) holds.
By contradiction, suppose there are two unclear types l∗ and l′∗ with l∗ < l
′
∗. By definition, these types are
neither 0-always nor 1-always. Therefore, there are two profiles satisfying fi(l∗) = 0 and fi(l′∗) = 1. Since all
edges between L and R are present in the graph OTi , the latter contains the cycle r1 → l′∗ → r0 → l∗ → r1
whose weight is −l∗ + l′∗ < 0. This contradicts OSP CMON and thus the hypothesis that the mechanism
was OSP.
We next observe that OSP 2CMON implies that there cannot be l∗ ∈ L and r∗ ∈ R such that both of
them are unclear. For l∗ < r∗, we consider two profiles such that fi(l∗) = 0 and fi(r∗) = 1 (these profiles
exist since these types are neither 0-always nor 1-always). The cycle between them has weight l∗ − r∗ < 0,
contradicting OSP 2CMON. For l∗ > r∗, we use two different profiles for which fi(l′∗) = 1 and fi(r
′
∗) = 0
(which again exist by the hypothesis on r∗ and l∗).
Finally, we observe that (2)-(3) and OSP 2CMON (Observation 3) imply (1).
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Structure of Negative-Weight Cycles. A crucial step is to provide a simple local-to-global characteri-
zation of OSP mechanisms which (essentially) involves only four type profiles. The following theorem states
that, if there is a negative-weight cycle with more than two edges but no length-two negative cycle (OSP
CMON is violated but OSP 2CMON holds), then there exists a cycle with a rather special structure, and this
special structure is fully specified by only four profiles (the cycle itself may involve several profiles though).
Theorem 2 (Four-Profile Characterization). Let M be a mechanism with implementation tree T and social
choice function f that is OSP 2CMON but not OSP CMON. Then, every negative-weight cycle C in some
OSP graph OTi is of the following form:
C = b(2) → b(1)  b(3) → b(4)  b(2) (4)
where these four profiles satisfy b
(1)
i < b
(2)
i < b
(3)
i < b
(4)
i , fi(b
(1)) = fi(b
(3)) = 1, and fi(b
(2)) = fi(b
(4)) = 0.
Moreover, there is no edge between b(2) and b(3) in OTi .
Proof. The key observation is that every negative-weight cycle C must contain both a positive-weight edge
(c(pos1), c(pos2)) and a negative-weight edge (c(neg1), c(neg2)) that satisfy c
(pos1)
i < c
(neg1)
i . This is because
the number of positive-weight edges equals the number of negative-weight edges in any cycle, and the weight
of these two edges is c
(pos1)
i and −c(neg1)i , respectively (Observation 1). Hence, cycle C is of the form
c(pos1) → c(pos2)  c(neg1) → c(neg2)  c(pos1) , (5)
where Observation 1 implies that fi(c
(pos1)) = 0 = fi(c
(neg2)) and fi(c
(pos2)) = 1 = fi(c
(neg1)), and also
c
(pos2)
i < c
(pos1)
i < c
(neg1)
i < c
(neg2)
i ,
where the first and the last inequalities follow from Observation 1 together with OSP 2CMON. This implies
the first part of the theorem by matching the profiles in (4) with those in (5).
We finally observe that OSP 2CMON implies that there is no edge between b(2) = c(pos1) and b(3) =
c(neg1) because otherwise the corresponding 2-cycle between these profiles would have negative weight:
Indeed, w(c(pos1) → c(neg1)) + w(c(neg1) → c(pos1)) = c(pos1)i − c(neg1)i < 0 since fi(c(pos1)) = 0 and
fi(c
(neg1)) = 1. This completes the proof.
The characterization of OSP CMON above will enable us to provide a simple local transformation of the
queries of an OSP mechanisms where we use only top or bottom queries.
Definition 2 (Top and Bottom Queries). Let i = i(u) for a node u of the implementation tree. If the query
at u partitions D
(u)
i into {minD(u)i } and D(u)i \ {minD(u)i } then we call the query at u a bottom query. A
top query at u, instead, separates the maximum of D
(u)
i from the rest.
3.2 OSP is Equivalent to Weak Interleaving
In this section, we show that without loss of generality, we can focus on OSP mechanisms where each agent
is asked only top queries or only bottom queries, except when her type becomes revealable (Condition 2 in
Lemma 1). In that sense, these mechanisms interleave top and bottom queries for an agent only in a “weak”
form. Specifically, let us begin by providing the following definition.
Definition 3 (Extremal, No Interleaving, Weak Interleaving). A mechanism is extremal if every query is a
bottom query or a top query (both types of queries may be used for the same agent).
An extremal mechanism makes no interleaving if each agent is consistently asked only at each history top
queries or only bottom queries (some agents may be asked top queries only, and other agents bottom queries
only).
A weak interleaving mechanism satisfies the condition that, if top queries and bottom queries are inter-
leaved for some agent i at some node u in the implementation tree, then agent i is revealable at u in the
sense of Condition 2 in Lemma 1.
Then, in this section we will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For each binary outcome problem, an OSP mechanism exists if and only if an extremal mech-
anism with weak interleaving exists.
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3.2.1 The Necessary Condition
We prove that the following transformations are always possible:
OSP mechanism⇒ OSP extremal mechanism⇒ OSP weak interleaving mechanism.
Intuitively, given the structure of admissible queries in Lemma 1, we show below that we can locally replace
every query with a homogeneous part (Condition 1) by an “homogeneous” sequence of only top queries or only
bottom queries. Moreover, these queries can also be used when the agent becomes revealable (Condition 2).
To this aim, we use the four-profile characterization of negative-weight cycles in Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Any OSP mechanism M = (f, p, T ) can be transformed into an equivalent extremal OSP
mechanism M ′ = (f, p, T ′).
Proof. Since the mechanism M is OSP, then OSP CMON must hold (Theorem 1). Let u be a node of T
where M is not extreme, and let i = i(u) be the corresponding divergent agent at u.
We locally modify T in order to make a suitable sequence of bottom queries and top queries about a
certain subset Q of types, before we make any further query in the two subtrees of u. This local modification
does not affect OSP CMON of agents different from i and it preserves OSP 2CMON for all agents (see
Appendix A.2 for details on this step). The proof uses the following main steps and key observations:
1. If OSP CMON is no longer true for T ′, then there exists a negative-weight cycle C′ which was not present
in OTi and therefore must use some added edges a(1) → a(2) that were not present in OTi and that have
been added to OT ′i because of the new queries for types in Q;
2. The negative-weight cycle C′ must be of the form specified by Theorem 2; in particular, the edge b(2) →
b(3) does not exist in OT ′i (which helps to determine properties of the four profiles characterizing C′);
3. We use the following bypass argument to conclude that in the original graph there is a negative-weight
cycle, thus contradicting OSP CMON of the original mechanism. Specifically, for every added edge
a(1) → a(2), the original graph OTi contains a bypass path a(1) → b(bp) → a(2) such that w(a(1) →
b(bp) → a(2)) ≤ w(a(1) → a(2)). By replacing every added edge in C′ with the corresponding bypass path,
we get a cycle C with negative weight, w(C) ≤ w(C′) < 0.
In the remainder of the proof, we distinguish the two possible cases on the structure of L and R at u in T
using the admissible queries characterization of Lemma 1:
Homogeneous case (Condition 1 in Lemma 1). Suppose R is the homogeneous part. We distinguish
the two sub-cases.
• All r ∈ R are 0-always. Let rmin be the minimum type in R and partition L into L(<rmin) :=
{l ∈ L : l < rmin} and L(≥rmin) = {l ∈ L : l ≥ rmin}. By OSP 2CMON (Observation 3), all types in
Q = R∪L(≥rmin) are 0-always. We perform a sequence of top queries on Q = R∪L(≥rmin) from the
largest to the smallest type.
In this case we have b
(2)
i ∈ L since there is no edge between b(2) and b(3) and fi(b(3)) = 1 implies
b
(3)
i ∈ L(<rmin). The bypassing argument is as follows:
b(bp) =
{
b(2) if a
(1)
i , a
(2)
i ∈ R
rmin if a
(1)
i , a
(2)
i ∈ L
where rmin = (rmin, r−i), for an r−i ∈ D(u)−i . Note that the bypass path a(1) → b(bp) → a(2) indeed
exists in all cases. Table 1 shows that the weight of the bypass path is at most the weight of the
corresponding edge in all possible cases (note that at least one between a
(1)
i and a
(2)
i must be in
Q = R ∪ L(≥rmin) in order for a(1) → a(2) to be a newly added edge).
• All r ∈ R are 1-always. This can be proved similarly to the previous subcase, by doing bottom
queries on the set Q = R ∪ L(<rmin), and by observing that OSP 2CMON implies that all types in
Q = R ∪ L(<rmin) are 1-always.
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a
(1)
i a
(2)
i fi(a
(1)) fi(a
(2)) w(a(1) → a(2)) w(a(1) → b(bp) → a(2))
R R 0 0 0 0
L(≥rmin) L(<rmin) 0 1 +a(1)i rmin (rmin ≤ a(1)i )
L(<rmin) L(≥rmin) 1 0 −a(1)i −a(1)i
Table 1: Bypassing path argument for the homogeneous case with all r ∈ R that are 0-always.
Revealable case (Condition 2 in Lemma 1). Suppose w.l.o.g. that L contains only 1-always and 0-always
types (otherwise, we consider R in place of L). We consider Q = L = L(0) ∪ L(1), where L(0) are the
0-always types of L, and L(1) are the 1-always types. In this case, we do top queries on L(0) and
bottom queries on L(1). The bypassing argument is as follows:
b(bp) =
{
b(2) if a
(2)
i ∈ L(0)
b(3) if a
(2)
i ∈ L(1)
so that fi(b
(bp)) = fi(a
(2)) and thus w(a(1) → b(bp) → a(2)) = w(a(1) → b(bp)) = w(a(1) → a(2))
as desired. Note that all edges a(1) → b(bp) → a(2) exist in the original graph OTi since a(1)i , a(2)i ∈
Q = L and b
(2)
i , b
(3)
i ∈ R, for otherwise b(2)i , b(3)i ∈ L and thus edge b(2) → b(3) would exist in OT
′
i ,
contradicting the conditions in Theorem 2.
We are now ready to show that one can think of weak interleaving OSP mechanisms without loss of
generality.
Theorem 5. Let M be an OSP extremal mechanism with implementation tree T . For any node u ∈ T , if
agent i = i(u) is not revealable at node u, then M has no interleaving for agent i at u.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that M interleaves the queries of agent i at u, and that i is not revealable
at u. Since there is interleaving then there is a v ∈ T in the path from the root of T to u such that the
mechanism makes a bottom query about the minimum x of her current domain at v, and a top query about
her current maximum x of her current domain at u, respectively. (The proof is the same when top and
bottom are swapped.)
The proof uses the same argument in the proof of Lemma 1. Using OSP 2CMON, we can show that the
bottom query type x must be 1-always at v, and the top query type x must be 0-always at u. Since i is not
revealable at u, subdomain D
(u)
i contains two distinct types t and t
′ that are neither 0-always nor 1-always
(thus, they are both different from x and x). Assume without loss of generality that t < t′, and observe that
there are profiles satisfying
fi(x) = 1 fi(t
′) = 1 fi(x) = 0 fi(t) = 0, (6)
where x−i ∈ D(v)−i , x−i ∈ D(u)−i , and suitable t′−i, t−i ∈ D(u)−i exist since t (t′) is 0-sometime (1-sometime) at
u. By (6) we get that the cycle C := x → t′ → x → t → x has weight w(x → t′) + w(t′ → x) + w(x →
t) +w(t→ x) = 0− t′ + 0+ t < 0, thus contradicting OSP CMON. Note that the edges of C indeed belong
to OTi , since x and x are separated from t and t′ at v and u, respectively. This completes the proof.
3.2.2 The Sufficient Condition
Theorem 6. An extremal mechanism with weak interleaving is OSP.
Proof. Firstly observe that any such mechanism is OSP 2CMON by construction. Assume by contradiction
that the mechanism is not OSP, and thus OSP CMON does not hold. Then there is some agent i for which
OTi has a negative-weight cycle C – let b(1),b(2),b(3) and b(4) be the profiles in C identified by Theorem 2.
Let u be the node of T where b(2)i and b(1)i are separated by the mechanism and b(2)−i ,b(1)−i ∈ D(u)−i . The
existence of the edge (b(2),b(1)) implies that such a node u exists. Similarly, let v be the node of the tree
where b
(1)
i and b
(3)
i are separated by T and b(3)−i ,b(1)−i ∈ D(v)−i . Observe that v must exist in the subtree
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Problem Bound
Known Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions (CAs)
√
m ([22] + Cor. 1)
MST (& weighted matroids) 1 ([19] + Cor. 1)
Max Weighted Matching 2 ([5] + Cor. 1)
p-systems† p ([17] + Cor. 1)
Weighted Vertex Cover 2 ([21] + Cor. 1)
Shortest Path ∞ (Thm 10)
Restricted Knapsack Auctions Ω(
√
n) (Thm 11)
Asymmetric Restricted Knapsack Auctions (3 values)
√
n− 1 (Thm 12)
Knapsack Auctions Ω(
√
lnn) (Thm 13)
Table 2: Bounds on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms. (The result for CAs has been also
observed by [8]. The mechanisms for matroids could be obtained also through Cor. 2.)
comprised of the path from the root of the tree to u and the tree rooted in u. In fact, if no such v existed
then the mechanism could not differentiate b(1) from b(3) and the existence of (b(2),b(1)) would yield the
existence of (b(2),b(3)) – a contradiction. Furthermore, the non-existence of (b(2),b(3)) implies that u = v,
and that in the partition of D
(u)
i defined at u, b
(3)
i and b
(2)
i belong to the same part. To see this, it is enough
to note that were v 6= u or b(3)i and b(2)i to belong to different parts, b(2) and b(3) would have to be connected
by an edge. Therefore, at u the mechanism splits D
(u)
i into {b(1)i } and (possibly a superset of) {b(2)i , b(3)i }.
We can now repeat the reasoning above on b(3),b(4) and b(2) and conclude that in w, the node of tree
where the mechanism separates b
(3)
i from b
(4)
i , D
(w)
i is split into {b(4)i } and (possibly a superset of) {b(2)i , b(3)i }.
Since both u and w have one branch labelled by b
(2)
i and b
(3)
i and that the leaves for profiles b
(2) and b(3)
will be in the subtree reached by that branch, it must be that u is an ancestor of w in T or viceversa. Focus
on the first case, meaning that b
(4)
i ∈ D(u)i , b(4)−i ∈ D(u)−i as well. (The other case is similar.) But then, since
b
(1)
i < b
(2)
i < b
(3)
i < b
(4)
i we have that b
(1)
i is the minimum at u. Similarly, we note that b
(4)
i is the maximum
at w, which means that the mechanism has interleaving at w. Therefore, i must have become revealable at
some point in the history before (and including) w. But, since Condition 2 of Lemma 1 holds (specifically,
(1) holds at w) it cannot be the case that fi(b
(2)) = 0 and fi(b
(3)) = 1 since b
(2)
i < b
(3)
i , a contradiction.
4 Two-way Greedy Algorithms
As noted above, our characterization does not require costs to be positive; so it holds true for negative
costs, that is, valuations. We will then talk now simply about type when we refer to the agents’ private
information, be it costs or valuations. We will also sometimes use the terminology of in-query (out-query,
respectively) to denote a bottom (top) query for costs and a top (bottom) query for valuations.
Definition 4 ((Anti-)Monotone Functions). We say that a function is monotone (antimonotone, respec-
tively) in the type if it is decreasing (increasing, respectively) in the cost, and increasing (decreasing, respec-
tively) in the valuation.
In this section, we translate our characterization into algorithmic insights on OSP mechanisms and show
a connection between their format and a certainly family of adaptive priority algorithms that they use. As a
by-product, we show the existence of a host of new mechanisms. We are able to provide the first set of upper
bounds on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms, that are independent from domain size (as in
[12, 11]) or assumptions on the designer’s power to catch and punish lies (as in [13, 14]), see Table 2. The
table also contains the new bounds we can prove on the approximation of OSP mechanisms, by leveraging
our algorithmic characterization (i.e., Theorems 10–13).
†A p-system is a downward-closed set system (E,F) where there are at most p circuits, that is, minimal subsets of E not
belonging to F [17].
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Algorithm 1: Forward greedy algorithm
1 Let b1, . . . , bn the input bids
2 P ← F (P is the set of all feasible solutions)
3 I ← ∅ (I is the set of infeasible agents, i.e., agents that cannot be included in the final solution)
4 A ← N (A is the set of active or infeasible agents)
5 while |P| > 1 do
6 Let i = argmaxk∈A\I g
(in)
k (bk,bN\A)
7 if there are solutions S in P such that i ∈ S then
8 Drop from P all the solutions S such that i 6∈ S (if any)
9 A ← A \ {i}
10 else
11 I ← I ∪ {i}
12 Return the only solution in P
Immediate-Acceptance Auctions and Forward Greedy. Let us begin by discussing forward greedy.
Definition 5 (Forward Greedy). A forward greedy algorithm uses functions g
(in)
i : R×Rk → R, k ≤ n− 1,
to rank the bids of the players and builds a solution by iteratively adding the agent with highest rank if that
preserves feasibility (cf. Algorithm 1).
A forward greedy algorithm is monotone if each g
(in)
i is monotone in i’s private type (i.e., its first
argument).
Few observations are in order for Algorithm 1. Firstly, it is not too hard to see that it will always return a
solution (i.e., there will eventually be a unique feasible solution in P). To see this consider the case in which
(at least) two solutions S, S′ are in P . Then there must exist an agent j such that j ∈ S∆S′, ∆ denoting
the symmetric difference between sets. This means that j ∈ A \ I and the forward greedy algorithm will
decide in the next steps whether j is part of the solution or not (and consequently whether to keep S or
S′). Secondly, we stress how a forward greedy algorithm belong to the family of adaptive priority algorithms
[7]. At Line 6, Algorithm 1 (potentially) updates the priority as a function of the bids of those bidders
who have left the auction (i.e., that are not active anymore). A peculiarity of the algorithm (to do with its
OSP implementation, cf. the proof of Corollary 1 below) is that the adaptivity does not depend on bidders
who despite their high priority cannot be part of the eventual solution (i.e., the agents we add to I).2 This
distinction would not be necessary if the problem at hand would be upward close (i.e., if a solution S is
feasible then any S′ ⊃ S would be in F too). Thirdly, a notable subclass of forward greedy algorithms are
fixed-priority algorithms, where Line 6 and the while loop are swapped (and priority functions only depend on
the agents’ types). (These algorithms do not need to keep record of I either.) This algorithmic paradigm has
been applied to different optimization problems (e.g., Kruskal’s Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) algorithm
[19]).
We define Immediate-Acceptance Auctions (IAAs) as mechanisms using only in-queries.
Corollary 1. An IAA that uses algorithm f is OSP if and only if f is monotone forward greedy.
Proof. We will prove this in the case in which types are costs; the proof is dual for valuations.
Let us start with the if condition; given a forward greedy algorithm f , we recursively define the imple-
mentation tree T of an IAA as follows. At each u ∈ T , we compute j = argmaxi∈A\I g(in)i (minD(u)i ,bN\A),
where D
(u)
i denotes, as above, the current domain of i at u, bN\A contains the bids of all the agents that
have been queried and have replied yes to a preceding query, and I contains the bidders that could not be
queried since they did not belong to any feasible solution. Since the algorithm is monotone, j is the agent
with maximum priority at this point of the execution. If including j in the solution is feasible then we ask
j an in-query to check if her type is minD
(u)
j . If she replies yes, we select her accordingly and continue the
2Note that a syntactically (but not semantically) alternative definition of forward greedy algorithms could do without I by
requiring an extra property on the priority functions (i.e., adaptively floor all the priorities of infeasible players).
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Algorithm 2: Reverse greedy algorithm
1 Let b1, . . . , bn the input bids
2 P ← F (P is the set of all feasible solutions)
3 I ← ∅ (I is the set of in agents, i.e., those that cannot be dropped)
4 A ← N (A is the set of active or in agents)
5 while |P| > 1 do
6 Let i = argmaxk∈A\I g
(out)
k (bk,bN\A)
7 if there are solutions S in P such that i 6∈ S then
8 Drop from P all the solutions S such that i ∈ S (if any)
9 A ← A \ {i}
10 else
11 I ← I ∪ {i}
12 Return the only solution in P
execution (i.e., remove j from A and set bj = minD(u)j ). If she replies no, we remove minD(u)j from her
current domain and continue accordingly. If selecting j is not feasible, then we add j to I and continue the
mechanism without any query to j. The mechanism then uses only a sequence of in-queries. Therefore, by
our characterization, there exist payments p such that (f, p, T ) is OSP.
For the opposite direction, let (f, p, T ) be an OSP IAA; by our characterization, we can restrict without
loss of generality to the extremal implementation. We define a monotone priority function g(in) for f , thus
showing that f is indeed a monotone forward greedy algorithm. We will do that recursively by visiting T in
level order. Given the root r of T where we are in-querying i we define the rank function g(in)i (minDi, ∅) to
be a suitable large value V . (Recall that in-queries are made for the smallest possible cost in the domain.)
Let j denote the agent queried in the child v of r where i has confirmed her type to be minDi. We set
g
(in)
j (minDj, {minDi}) to be V − 1. While for k, the agent interrogated at the other child of r, we set
g
(in)
j (minDj, ∅) = V − 1. Observe how we are gradually building the set N \ A of agents that have left the
auction. (We remark how for this direction of the proof we do not need to use I.) We can continue in this
fashion until we reach the leaves of T .
We note how all fixed-priority algorithms are OSP but not all OSP mechanism must use a fixed-priority
algorithm. In fact, for a fixed-priority algorithm the sufficiency proof alone would go through; the second
parameter of the priority functions is only needed for the opposite direction.
It is important to compare the result above with [25, Footnote 15], where it is observed how the strategic
properties of forward and reverse greedy algorithms are different. The remark applies to auctions where
these algorithms are augmented by the so-called threshold payment scheme. Our result shows that there
exist alternative payment schemes for this important algorithmic design paradigm. 3
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Reverse Greedy. Another algorithmic approach that can be
used to obtain OSP mechanisms is reverse greedy (see Algorithm 2), that is, having an out-priority function
that is antimonotone with each agent’s type and drops agents accordingly. In its auction format, this is
known as Deferred-Acceptance Auctions (DAAs), see, e.g., [25].
Definition 6 (Reverse Greedy). A reverse greedy algorithm uses functions g
(out)
i : R×Rk → R, k ≤ n− 1,
to rank the bids of the players and iteratively excludes the player with highest rank (if feasible) until only one
solution is left (cf. Algorithm 2).
A reverse greedy algorithm is antimonotone if each g
(out)
i is antimonotone in i’s private type (i.e., its
first argument).
3It is indeed crucial to define payments that depend on the implementation tree for an IAA that is OSP; in Appendix B, we
give an example showing how this works for a well known forward-greedy algorithm for single-minded CAs.
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Algorithm 3: Two-way greedy algorithm
1 Let b1, . . . , bn the input bids
2 P ← F (P is the set of all feasible solutions)
3 I ← ∅ (I is the set of infeasible and in agents)
4 A ← N (A is the set of all agents that are active or infeasible or in)
5 while |P| > 1 do
6 Let i(in) = argmaxk∈A\I g
(in)
k (bk,bN\A)
7 Let i(out) = argmaxk∈A\I g
(out)
k (bk,bN\A)
8 Let i be the agent corresponding to max
{
g
(in)
i(in)
(bi(in) ,bN\A), g
(out)
i(out)
(bi(out) ,bN\A)
}
9 if i = i(in)∧ there are solutions S in P such that i ∈ S then
10 Drop from P all the solutions S such that i 6∈ S (if any)
11 A ← A \ {i}
12 else if i = i(out)∧ there are solutions S in P such that i 6∈ S then
13 Drop from P all the solutions S such that i ∈ S (if any)
14 A ← A \ {i}
15 else
16 I ← I ∪ {i}
17 Return the only solution in P
Similarly to the case of forward greedy, the algorithm need not use I for downward-closed problems (i.e.,
every subset of a feasible solution is feasible as well). Incidentally, this is the way it is discussed in [9].
The following corollary can be proved very similarly to Corollary 1 (in fact, it is sufficient to substitute
in-queries and min with out-query and max, respectively).
Corollary 2 ([25]). A DAA using algorithm f is OSP if and only if f is an antimonotone reverse greedy
algorithm.
It is convenient to discuss the relative power of forward and reverse greedy algorithms. We now know
from Corollaries 1 and 2 that they are strategically equivalent. Algorithmically, however, there are some
differences. There are algorithms and problems, such as, the aforementioned Kruskal and MST, where we
can take the reverse version of forward greedy (e.g., for MST, start with the entire edge set, go through
the edges from the most expensive to the cheaper, and remove an edge whenever it does not disconnect the
graph) without any consequence to the approximation guarantee. For the minimum spanning tree problem
(and, more generally, for finding the minimum-weight basis of a matroid), the reverse greedy algorithm is
just as optimal as the forward one. In general (and even for, e.g., bipartite matching), the reverse version of
a forward greedy algorithm with good approximation guarantee can be bad [9].
OSP Mechanisms and Two-way Greedy. Our characterization shows that the right algorithmic tech-
nique for OSP is a suitable combination of forward and reverse greedy.
Definition 7 (Two-way Greedy). A two-way greedy algorithm uses functions g
(in)
i : R × Rk → R and
g
(out)
i : R×Rk → R, k ≤ n− 1, for each agent i, to rank the bids of the players, and iteratively and greedily
includes (if highest priority comes from a g(in) function) or excludes (if highest priority comes from a g(out))
– whenever possible – the player with the highest rank until one feasible solution is left (cf. Algorithm 3).
A two-way greedy is all-monotone if each g
(in)
i is monotone in i’s private type and g
(out)
i is antimonotone
in i’s private type (i.e., their first argument).
To fully capture the strategic properties of two-way greedy algorithms, we need to define one more
property for which we need some background definitions. Consider the total increasing4 ordering ϕ of the
4For notational simplicity, we here assume that there are not ties between the priority functions.
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∏
i |Di| functions5
{g(⋆)i (b,b)}i∈N,b∈Di,b∈D−i,⋆∈{in,out}
used by a two-way greedy algorithm. Given ϕℓ = g
(⋆)
i (bi,bN\Aℓ), the ℓ-th entry of ϕ, we let D
≺
j (ℓ) (D
≻
j (ℓ),
respectively) denote the set of types b ∈ Dj such that g(⋆)j (b,bN\A) > ϕℓ (g(⋆)j (b,bN\A) < ϕℓ, respectively)
with A ⊇ Aℓ (A ⊆ Aℓ, respectively). Moreover, we add bi (the bid defining ϕℓ) to D≺i (ℓ). In words, once
in the ordering we reach the ℓ-th entry for a certain agent type and a given “history” (i.e., bN\Aℓ) with
D≺j (ℓ) we denote all the types that the algorithm has already explored for agent j at this point (that is, for
a compatible prior history bN\Aℓ with A ⊇ Aℓ). Similarly, D≻j (ℓ) denotes those types in Dj that are yet
to be considered from this history onwards. Finally, for d ∈ {in, out} we let d be a shorthand for the other
direction, that is, {d} = {in, out} \ {d}.
Definition 8 (Interleaving Algorithm). We say that a two-way greedy algorithm is interleaving if for each
i and A ⊆ N the following occurs. For each ϕℓ = g(d)i (b,bN\A) such that for some A′ ⊆ A it holds
g
(d)
i (b
′,bN\A′) = ϕℓ′ with b′ ∈ D≻i (ℓ) (and then ℓ′ > ℓ) we have
g
(⋆)
i (x,bN\A′) > g
(⋆)
j (y,bN\A′)
for each y ∈ D≻j (ℓ′) and for all (but at most one) x in D≻i (ℓ′) (⋆ ∈ {in, out}).
The definition above captures in algorithmic terms the weak interleaving property of extensive-form
implementations. Whenever there is a change of direction (from d to d) for a certain agent i and two
compatible histories (cf. condition A′ ⊆ A) then it must be the case that i is revealable and all the other
unexplored types (but at most one) must be explored next.
Example 1 (Interleaving Algorithm). Consider a setting with three agents, called x, y and z. The valuation
domain is the same for all the agents and has maximum tmax and minimum tmin. Consider the two-way
greedy algorithm with the following ordering ϕ:
g(in)x (tmax) > g
(in)
y (tmax) > g
(out)
z (tmin) > g
(out)
y (tmin) > . . .
(where the second argument is omitted since it is ∅). Let us focus on ϕ2 = g(in)y (tmax). Here D≺x (2) and
D≺y (2) is {tmax} (as it has been already considered for both agents) whilst D≻x (2) and D≻y (2) is equal to the
original domain but tmax. For z, instead, D
≺
z (2) = ∅ and D≻z (2) is still the original domain. At ϕ4 there
is a change of direction for agent y. The two-way greedy is interleaving if the domain has only three types
(since there are no constraints on the in/out priority for third type in the domain of y). For larger domains,
instead, we need to look at the next entries of ϕ to ascertain whether the algorithm is interleaving or not.
We are now ready to show that two-way greedy is indeed the algorithmic nature of OSP.
Corollary 3. A mechanism using algorithm f is OSP if and only if f is an all-monotone interleaving
two-way greedy algorithm.
Proof. The result can be proved very similarly to Corollaries 1 and 2. For the if part, we can define an
implementation tree using the priority functions exactly as described in those proofs.
For the only if direction, we cannot directly use the implementation tree of the OSP mechanism to
iteratively define the priority functions, as this might violate the interleaving property (in general an OSP
mechanism can perform the revelation queries in any order rather than immediately as requested by Definition
8). However, we can use the claim below and first modify the OSP mechanism to be well ordered. We say
that a mechanism is well ordered if whenever an agent becomes revealable, the mechanism finds her type
before querying any other agent. We next show (proof in the appendix) that we can restrict our attention
to extremal OSP mechanisms that are well ordered.
5The algorithm must not necessarily have a definition for the priority functions for all the combinations of type/history as
some might never get explored. In this case, we set all the undefined entries to sufficiently small (tie-less, for simplicity) values.
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Observation 4. For any OSP extremal mechanism M = (f, p, T ), there is a well-ordered extremal mecha-
nism M ′ = (f, p, T ′) that is OSP.
We can now use the new implementation tree and obtain priority functions that define a two-way greedy
algorithm that is all-monotone and interleaving. This concludes the proof.
Given the corollary above, we will henceforth simply say two-way greedy (algorithm) and avoid stating
the properties of all-monotonicity and interleaving. The next subsections contain an analysis of two-way
greedy in terms of approximation guarantee (in comparison to forward/reverse in Section 4.1 and in their
own right in Section 4.2).
4.1 Two-way vs Forward/Reverse Greedy
We next prove that two-way greedy algorithms are in general more powerful than single-directional greedy
algorithms, for both social welfare maximization (types are valuations) and social cost minimization (types
are costs).
We begin with costs and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Social Cost). There are set systems in which two-way greedy algorithms are α-approximate,
for some α > 1, but both forward and reverse greedy do not return a better than ρ-approximation to the
optimal social cost, with ρ/α > 1.02.
Proof. Consider two parallel solutions with 1 and 2 agents, respectively: S = {x} and T = {y, z} and let
their domain be Dx = Dy = Dz = {tmin, tmed, tmax} = {10, 22, 36}. We shall consider the first query of
the algorithm (thus bN\A = bN\N = ∅) to some agent a, and use g(⋆)a (ba) as a shorthand for g(⋆)a (ba, ∅)
to represent this first query (⋆ ∈ {in, out} and a ∈ {x, y, z}). We will denote as (bx, by, bz) an instance of
the problem in which the type of the unique agent in S is bx and agents in T have types by and bz. We
distinguish the two cases and the corresponding approximation guarantee β:
Forward greedy
(
β ≥ min
{
tmax
2tmin
, 1 + tmin
tmax
})
: Consider gS = g
(in)
x (36) and gT = max{g(in)y (10), g(in)z (10)}.
If gS > gT , it means that the algorithm has approximation at least
36
20 > 1.1 (consider the instance
(36, 10, 10)). On the other hand, if gS < gT then the approximation guarantee of the algorithm is
46
36 > 1.1 (consider the instance (36, 10, 36)).
Reverse greedy
(
β ≥ min
{
2tmed
tmax
, tmax
tmin+tmed
})
: Let gS = g
(out)
x (36) and gT = max{g(out)y (22), g(out)z (22)}.
If gS > gT , it means that the the algorithm is
44
36 > 1.1 approximate (consider the instance (36, 22, 22)).
On the contrary, if gS < gT , then the approximation guarantee of the algorithm is at least
36
32 > 1.1
(consider the instance (36, 10, 22), where 22 is for the agent in T with maximum rank).
Intuitively, in either case (forward or reverse) greedy has to decide too early (which agent will be in) the
solution.
Consider now the following algorithm: return T if at least one of its agents has type 10, no of its agents
have type 36, and the agent in S has type 36, otherwise return S. It is not hard to see that this algorithm
can be implemented as a two-way greedy algorithm. The only case in which this algorithm does not return
an optimal outcome is on instance (22, 10, 10), where the optimum would be T , and the algorithm returns
S. However, the approximation ratio is 2220 = 1.1.
For valuations, we have the following bound.
Theorem 8 (Social Welfare). There are set system problems in which two-way greedy algorithms are optimal
whilst both forward and reverse greedy do not return a better than
√
2-approximation to the optimal social
welfare.
Proof. Consider the case in which F is comprised of only two solutions S = {x} and T = {y, z} with 1 and
2 agents, respectively, and let the valuation domain be Di = {tmin, tmed, tmax} for each i, where tmin = 0,
tmed = 1/
√
2 and tmax = 1. Observe that in this setup as soon as an agent becomes inactive the outcome is
determined; therefore, the priority functions will never use their second parameter. Accordingly, as above,
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Algorithm 4: Two-greedy Algorithm for the instance of Theorem 9
1 Set R = ∅ // R records the i ∈ T that cannot be returned;
2 if there is i ∈ T whose valuation is tmax then return T ;
3 if iS has valuation tmin then return T ;
4 for j = 1, . . . , k do
5 if ij has valuation tmin then
6 Set R = R ∪ {ij};
7 if |R| = k2 then break;
8 else
9 if iS has valuation tmed then return T \R;
10 if |R| = k2 then
11 if iS has valuation tmax then return S;
12 if j = k2 then // I.e., it has not been checked if iS has valuation tmed
13 if there is i ∈ T \R whose valuation is tmed then return T \R;
14 else return S;
15 else return T \R;
we use here g(⋆)(b) as a shorthand for g(⋆)(b, ∅). As above, (bx, by, bz) denotes an instance in which the type
of the unique agent in S is bx and agents in T have types by and bz.
We begin with the analysis of a forward greedy algorithm. We next show that this algorithm will
either return S for the profile (tmax, tmed, tmed) or T for the profile (tmax, tmed, tmin). In both cases, the
approximation ratio is
√
2. We begin by observing that the priority of y and z for tmax must be the
two highest ones (otherwise the approximation guarantee would be at least 1 + 1/
√
2 >
√
2). Now it
can either be g
(in)
x (tmax) > max{g(in)y (tmed), g(in)z (tmed)} – which corresponds to the former outcome – or
g
(in)
x (tmax) < max{g(in)y (tmed), g(in)z (tmed)} – which implies the second outcome.
Similarly, a reverse greedy either returns S for the profile (tmed, tmax, tmin) or T for (tmed, tmin, tmin). The
approximation ratio is at least
√
2 in both cases. Note that g
(out)
x (tmin) must be the highest priority (for other-
wise the approximation is worse than
√
2). Then we compare g
(out)
x (tmed) with max{g(out)y (tmin), g(out)z (tmin)}.
If the latter is larger than the former we get the first outcome; otherwise, we get the second outcome.
We now conclude the proof by observing that the following algorithm is optimal on this instance: return
T if by = tmax or bz = tmax or bx = tmin; otherwise, if by = tmin or bz = tmin return S and, in all the
remaining cases, return T . It is not hard to see that this can be actually implemented with a two-way greedy
algorithm. Specifically, the the following priority functions would suffice:
g(in)y (tmax) > g
(in)
z (tmax) > g
(out)
x (tmin) > g
(out)
y (tmin) > g
(out)
z (tmin) > g
(in)
y (tmed).
Finally, we consider the relative power of the greedy paradigms for downward-closed set systems (and
social welfare maximization).
Theorem 9 (Downward-Close Solutions). There are downward-close set system problems in which two-way
greedy algorithms can return an α-approximation, whilst both forward and reverse greedy do not return a
better than β-approximation to the optimal social welfare, with β
α
≈ 1.3.
Proof. Consider the case in which F is comprised of solutions S = {iS}, T = {i1, . . . , ik} with even k ≥ 4,
and all the subsets of T . Let the valuation domain be Di = {tmin, tmed, tmax} for each i, where tmin = 1,
tmed = ρk and tmax =
k
2 tmin +
k
2 tmed =
k
2 (ρk + 1), with ρ =
1+
√
5
2 .
Consider then the algorithm defined in Algorithm 4. It is not hard to check that this algorithm is two-
way greedy (incidentally, the interleaving property is trivially satisfied by these rankings since the valuation
domain has size 3).
As for the approximation ratio of this algorithm, observe that it returns the optimal solution at Line 2,
Line 9, Line 11, Line 14. Instead, if the solution returned at Line 9, Line 13 or Line 15 has value C, then
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the optimal solution would have value C + |R|tmin, with C ≥ tmed + (k − |R| − 1)tmin and |R| ≤ k2 . Hence,
the approximation ratio of this algorithm is
α =
C + |R|tmin
C
= 1 +
|R|tmin
C
≤ 1 + |R|tmin
tmed + (k − |R| − 1)tmin
≤ 1 +
k
2 tmin
tmed +
(
k
2 − 1
)
tmin
= 1 +
k
2
ρk + k2 − 1
=
(ρ+ 1)k − 1(
ρ+ 12
)
k − 1 .
Let us now consider reverse greedy algorithms. After that solution S has been ruled out if iS has valuation
tmin, the algorithm either must rule out all i ∈ T if their valuation is tmin or it rules out S if iS has valuation
tmed. Indeed, if none of these cases occurs, then the same solution is returned on instance b such that
biS = tmax, and bi = tmin for every i ∈ T and on instance b′ such that b′iS = tmed, b′i∗ = tmax and b′i = tmin
for every i 6= i∗ ∈ T , where i∗ is the one i ∈ T that is not ruled out if the valuation is tmin. In any case, the
returned solution will have approximation larger than k2 > ρ.
If there is i∗ such that i∗ is not ruled out if her valuation is tmin before iS is ruled out if her valuation is
tmed, then it must be the case that on instance b
′ such that b′iS = tmed and b
′
i = tmin for every i ∈ T , the
returned solution will have a value that is at most ktmin. Hence, the approximation ratio would be
tmed
ktmin
= ρ.
If, instead, all i ∈ S are ruled out if their valuation is tmin before iS is ruled out if her valuation is tmed,
then it must be the case that on instance b′ such that b′iS = b
′
i∗ = tmed and b
′
i = tmin for every i 6= i∗ ∈ T ,
i∗ being the last i ∈ T to be processed by the algorithm, the returned solution will have a value that is at
most tmed, whereas the optimal solution has value tmed+(k− 1)tmin. Hence, the approximation ratio would
be β = tmed+(k−1)tmin
tmed
= (ρ+1)k−1
ρk
. Observe that β ≤ ρ+1
ρ
= 3+
√
5
1+
√
5
= ρ.
Consider now forward greedy algorithms. After the solution T is returned if there is i ∈ T whose valuation
is tmax, the algorithm must either return S if the valuation of iS = tmax or return T if i whose valuation is
tmed, for some i ∈ T . Indeed, if none of these case occurs, then the same solution is returned on instance b′
such that b′iS = tmax and b
′
i = tmin for every i ∈ T and on instance b′′ such that b′′iS = tmin, and b′′i = tmed
for every i ∈ T . In both cases, the returned solution will have approximation ratio larger than ρ.
If the algorithm return S if iS has valuation tmax before that some i ∈ T is evaluated, then it must be
the case that the algorithm returns S on instance b′ such that b′iS = tmax and b
′
i = tmed for every i ∈ T ,
while T is the optimal solution. Hence, the approximation ratio would be ktmed
tmax
= ρk
ρk2
2 +
k
2
= ρ 2k
ρk−1 ≥ ρ.
Finally, if the algorithm return S as soon as there is i ∈ T whose valuation is tmed, then the algorithm
returns T on instance b′ such that b′iS = tmax, b
′
i∗ = tmed and b
′
i = tmin for every i 6= i∗ ∈ T . Hence, in this
case the approximation is larger than k2 > ρ.
In conclusion, no forward and reverse algorithm can return an approximation that is better than β. Hence
the ratio between the approximation ratio of the two-way greedy algorithm and the best forward/reverse
greedy algorithm is β
α
=
(ρ+ 12 )k−1
ρk
= (2+
√
5)k−1
(1+
√
5)k
, that tends to 2+
√
5
1+
√
5
≈ 1.3 as k increases.
4.2 Approximation Guarantee of Two-way Greedy Algorithms
We next prove that the approximation ratio of two-way greedy algorithms is unbounded in set systems where
we want to output the solution with minimum social cost for some (minimal) structure of F . Examples
include the shortest path problem. For such problems, a two-way greedy algorithm must commit immediately
to a solution after the first decision in either Line 10 or 13. This leads to unboundedness.
Theorem 10 (Social Cost). For any ρ ≥ 1, there exists a set system such that no two-way greedy algorithm
returns a ρ-approximation to the optimal social cost, even if there are only two feasible solutions and four
agents.
Proof. Consider a set system with only two feasible solutions, say S and T , consisting of s > 1 and k ≥ s
agents, respectively, and no agent belonging to both solutions. For each agent i, we suppose that the cost
domain has minimum tmin and maximum tmax, such that
tmax
tmin
> max
{
ρk−1
s−1 , ρ · k−1s−ρ
}
≥ k−1
s−1 . We focus
on the maximum rank priority at the beginning of the algorithm (and, accordingly, we drop the second
parameter for the priority functions).
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If the maximum is g
(in)
i (tmin) for i ∈ S then it may be the case that the returned solution has cost tmin+
(s− 1)tmax, whereas the remaining solution would have cost ktmin < tmin + (s− 1)tmax. The approximation
factor would then be at least tmin+(s−1)tmax
ktmin
> ρ.
On the other hand, if the maximum is g
(out)
i (tmax) for i ∈ T then it may be the case that the returned
solution has cost stmax, whereas the remaining solution would have cost tmax + (k − 1)tmin < stmax. The
approximation factor would then be at least stmax
tmax+(k−1)tmin > ρ.
It is easy to check that any other choice for the highest priority would be even worse than the ones
discussed above (since we would be committing to output the solution with more agents or exclude the
solution with less agents). The theorem then follows.
We now consider the case where the players have valuations and we are interested in maximizing the
social welfare. We call this setup where no further assumption on the structure of the feasible solutions in F
can be made, a restricted knapsack auction problem. This is very much related to the knapsack auctions in
[9], where the authors further assume that F is downward closed (see below for a discussion of this setup).
The theorem below proves that when F is comprised of only two different solutions, then a two-way greedy
algorithm cannot return a better than
√
n− 1-approximation.
Theorem 11 (Social Welfare). There exists a set system for which any two-way greedy algorithm has
approximation Ω(
√
n) to the optimal social welfare, even if there are only two feasible solutions.
Proof. Consider the case in which F is comprised of only two solutions S = {iS} and |T | = k = n − 1 > 1
with S∩T = ∅. Let the valuation domain be Di = {tmin, tmed, tmax} for each i, where tmin = 0, tmed = 1/
√
k
and tmax = 1. As in the proof of Theorem 8, we can here restrict, without loss of generality, to priority
functions that only use the first parameter (and, consequently, we drop the second parameter from our
notation). We will prove that no two-way greedy algorithm can return a better than
√
k-approximation to
the social welfare, thus proving the claim.
Assume not and let ρ denote the approximation guarantee of the algorithm. We begin by showing some
properties on the priority function. We have
g
(in)
iT
(tmax) > max
{
max
j∈T
g
(out)
j (tmin), g
(in)
iS
(tmax), g
(out)
iS
(tmed)
}
, (7)
where iT = argmini∈T g
(in)
i (tmax) and, as from above, iS denotes the only agent in S. It is not hard to check
that ρ would be worse than
√
k if the above were not satisfied. Specifically, by all-monotonicity, if for some
j ∈ T we had
g
(in)
iT
(tmax) < g
(out)
j (tmin) =⇒ ρ =∞ (instance s.t. bj = tmin, biS = tmin and biT = tmed for all T ∋ j′ 6= j),
g
(in)
iT
(tmax) < g
(in)
iS
(tmax) =⇒ ρ >
√
k (instance s.t. bj = tmed for all T ∋ j 6= iT , biS = tmax and biT = tmax),
g
(in)
iT
(tmax) < g
(out)
iS
(tmed) =⇒ ρ =∞ (instance s.t. bj = tmin for all j ∈ T , biS = tmed).
Observe that by all-monotonicity, the inequality above leaves only the relative rank of g
(out)
iS
(tmin) undeter-
mined. Now we compare
g
(in)
jT
(tmed) with g
(out)
iS
(tmin),
where jT = argmaxj∈T g
(in)
j (tmed).
Assume first that g
(in)
jT
(tmed) > g
(out)
iS
(tmin). Here the approximation guarantee is at least
√
k. Indeed,
if g
(in)
iS
(tmax) > g
(in)
jT
(tmed) consider the instance where biS = tmax and bj = tmed for all j ∈ T . For the
opposite case, the bound is proved for the instance wherein biS = tmax, bj = tmin for all j ∈ T, j 6= jT , and
bjT = tmed.
Consider now the case g
(in)
jT
(tmed) < g
(out)
iS
(tmin). We here have
g
(out)
iS
(tmin) > max
{
max
j∈T
g
(out)
j (tmin), g
(in)
iS
(tmax)
}
. (8)
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Algorithm 5: Priorities for asymmetric instances of restricted knapsack auctions
1 Set g
(in)
i (tmax) > V , for i ∈ T and a suitably large V
2 if tmed ≤ tmaxk ∨ tmaxtmed+(k−1)tmin >
ktmed
tmax
then
3 Set V ′ < g(in)i (tmed) < g
(in)
iS
(tmax) < V , for all i ∈ T and a suitably large V ′
4 else
5 Set V > g
(in)
i (tmed) > g
(in)
iS
(tmax) > V
′, for all i ∈ T and a suitably large V ′
6 if tmed > ktmin then
7 Set V ′′ < g(in)iS (tmed) < V
′ for a suitably large V ′′
8 Set g
(in)
i (tmin) < V
′′ for an i ∈ T (for a suitable V ′′ < V ′ if undefined)
If this were not true then the approximation guarantee ρ would be worse than
√
k:
g
(out)
iS
(tmin) < g
(out)
j (tmin) =⇒ ρ =∞ (instance where biS = tmin and bj = tmed for all j ∈ S),
g
(out)
iS
(tmin) < g
(in)
iS
(tmax) =⇒ ρ ≥
√
k (instance where bj = tmed for all j ∈ S, biS = tmax).
By putting together (7) and (8) we know that in-priorities for players in T and out-priority for iS have highest
rank. The proof now concludes by arguing that no matter what priority is next in rank, the algorithm will
have an approximation ratio of at least
√
k:
g
(in)
i (tmed), i ∈ T =⇒ ρ ≥
√
k (instance s.t. bi = tmed, bj = tmin, for all T ∋ j 6= i and biS = tmax),
g
(out)
i (tmin), i ∈ T =⇒ ρ ≥ k − 1 (instance s.t. bi = tmin, bj = tmed for all T ∋ j 6= i and biS = tmed),
g
(in)
iS
(tmax) =⇒ ρ ≥
√
k (instance s.t. bj = tmed for all j ∈ T and biS = tmax),
g
(out)
iS
(tmed) =⇒ ρ =∞ (instance s.t. bj = tmin for all j ∈ T , biS = tmed).
Interestingly the proof above uses a so-called asymmetric instance [9] where one solution is a singleton
and the other is comprised of all the remaining bidders. We here prove that the analysis above is tight at
least for three-value domains, by giving a matching upper bound for the asymmetric instances of restricted
knapsack auctions. We design a forward greedy algorithm, thus also proving that there is no gap between
forward and two-way greedy in this context.
Theorem 12. There is a
√
n− 1-approximate forward greedy algorithm for the asymmetric restricted knap-
sack auctions, when bidders have a three-value domain {tmin, tmed, tmax}.
Proof. Let k = n − 1 and let T denote the solution with more than one agent in the asymmetric instance
of the restricted knapsack auction, S denoting the other (and iS its only element). The algorithm uses
the priority function rank defined in Algorithm 5. In words, the algorithm gives maximum priority to the
agents in T for the highest possible valuation. Then depending on the relationship between the values in the
domain, it either gives higher priority to the elements of T for tmed or to iS for tmax. Finally, if tmed > ktmin,
the priority for S and tmed is defined, before concluding with a “dummy” priority to return T . We next
show that the approximation guarantee of the algorithm, denoted as ρ below, is at most
√
k.
First let us consider the case in which tmed ≤ tmax/k. Here irrespectively of the value tmin, the forward
greedy algorithm defined above returns the optimal solution.
When tmed > tmax/k then it is not hard to see that
ρ = min
{
tmax
tmed + (k − 1)tmin ,
ktmed
tmax
}
.
The former (latter, respectively) occurs when we return T (S, respectively) by giving a higher (lower,
respectively) value to g
(in)
i (tmed), for i ∈ T , as opposed to g(in)iS (tmax), cf. Line 5 (Line 3, respectively) of
Algorithm 5. Since tmin ≥ 0, then ρ is maximized when
tmax
tmed + (k − 1)tmin =
ktmed
tmax
=⇒ tmed = tmax√
k
,
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which yields ρ =
√
k as desired.
We now turn our attention to downward-close set systems for social welfare maximization. As from
above, this is a generalization of the setting studied in [9], called knapsack auctions and defined as follows.
There are n bidders and m copies of one item; each bidder has a private valuation vi to receive at least
si copies of the item, si being public knowledge. A solution is feasible if the sum of items allocated to
bidders is at most m. The objective is social welfare maximization. Recall that the authors give a O(lnm)-
approximate DAA/reverse greedy algorithm and prove a lower bound of lnτ m, for a positive constant τ ,
limited to DAA/reverse greedy. We next show that the upper bound is basically tight for the entire class of
OSP mechanisms.
Theorem 13 (Social Welfare Downward-Closed Set Systems). There is a downward-close set system for
which every two-way greedy algorithm has approximation Ω(
√
lnn) to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider the case in which F is comprised of the following solutions: S = {iS}, T – with |T | = k =
n−1 > 1 and S∩T = ∅ – and all the subsets of T . Let the valuation domain beDi = {tx : x = 1, . . . , k}∪{0, 1}
for each agent i, where tx =
1
x
√
2 ln k
. From now on, let also set ρ =
√
ln k√
2+ε
, for ε > 0; ρ will denote the
approximation guarantee of the two-way greedy algorithm.
Let us first discuss some properties of these valuations. First observe that for every x ≥ 2⌈lnk⌉
xt2 >
2 lnk
2
√
2 ln k
=
√
ln k√
2
> ρ. (9)
Similarly, for every x ≤ k, it holds that for every y < x
t1 + (x− y)tk−y = 1√
2 lnk
(
1 +
x− y
k − y
)
≤ 2√
2 ln k
=
√
2√
ln k
<
1
ρ
. (10)
Moreover, we have that for every x = 2, . . . , k
1
(x− 1)√2 lnk + (x− 1)
1
x
√
2 ln k
=
1√
2 ln k
x2 − x+ 1
x2 − x ≤
1√
ln k
3
2
√
2
<
√
2√
ln k
<
1
ρ
. (11)
On the other hand, for x ≥ ln k + 1 we have
1
x
√
2 ln k
+ (x− 1) 1√
2 ln k
≥ (x− 1) 1√
2 ln k
≥ ln k√
2
√
ln k
=
√
ln k√
2
> ρ. (12)
Finally, observe that
k∑
x=1
1
x
√
2 lnk
=
Hk√
2 lnk
≥ ln k√
2
√
ln k
> ρ (Hk denoting the k-th armonic number), (13)
and that
2⌈lnk⌉∑
x=1
1
x
√
2 lnk
=
H2⌈ln k⌉√√
2 ln k
≤ 1 + δ√
2
ln (2 ⌈ln k⌉)√
ln k
< 1, (14)
where δ is a small constant that goes to 0 as k increases, and the last inequality holds for k sufficiently large.
Let us rename the agents as ik, . . . , i1 where ij is the agent with the maximum out-priority on the history
compatible with ij+1, . . . , ik having valuation tj+1, . . . , tk, respectively. We now focus on the instance b
such that biS = 1 and bik = tk. Observe that S cannot be returned on this instance, otherwise by (13), the
mechanism would have an approximation ratio worse than ρ. Hence, let us now focus only on the rankings
of i ∈ T .
We first prove that for everyO ⊆ T of size at least k−2⌈lnk⌉ it holds that g(out)i (0,bN\A) > g(in)i (1,bN\A)
for every i ∈ O and every A such that N \ O ⊆ A. Suppose indeed that this is not the case, and there
is a set U of size at least 2⌈lnk⌉ and a suitable A, such that g(in)i (1,bN\A) > g(out)i (0,bN\A) for every
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i ∈ U . We must then have that g(out)i (0,bN\A) > g(in)i (t1,bN\A) for every i ∈ U , because otherwise the
solution T ∩ A will be returned by the algorithm even on the instance b′ such that b′iS = 1, b′N\A = bN\A,
b′i = minj∈A bj for i ∈ A \ U , b′i∗ = t1, and b′i = 0 for every i ∈ U \ {i∗}, where i∗ is the one i ∈ U for which
g
(out)
i (0,bN\A) < g
(out)
i (t1,bN\A). Hence, the solution of the returned solution is t1 + |A \ U |minj∈A bj ,
that, by (10) is worse than a ρ-approximation of the optimal solution (i.e., S). Thus, for every i ∈ U we
have g
(in)
i (1,bN\A) > g
(out)
i (0,bN\A) > g
(in)
i
(
t1,bN\A
)
and then a change of direction occurs for all these
agents. By the interleaving property, either there is i that is selected (and thus S is not) in both b′ and b′′
or no i ∈ U is selected in b′′, where b′ is as defined above, and b′′iS = 1, b′′N\A = bN\A, b′′j = t2 for every
remaining j (it includes every i ∈ U). By (9) and (10), it turns out that in both cases the approximation
factor is worse than ρ.
We next show that no change of direction in the priorities of agents i ∈ O occurs until at least k− ⌈ln k⌉
of them have been dropped. Consider otherwise that a change of direction occurs when only x agents have
been dropped, for x < k − ⌈ln k⌉. Take then instances b′ and b′′, for which there is a subset U ⊆ T of size
k − x such that b′i = b′′i = 0 for every i ∈ U , b′iS = b′′iS = 1, b′i∗ = tx, b′j = t1, while b′′i∗ = tx−1, b′′j = tx,
for all j 6= i∗ ∈ T \ U . Now by (11), i must not be part of the solution for b′′ whilst by (12) she must be
in the solution returned for b′. Therefore, there are two different types tx−1 > tx whose monotone priority
cannot be defined when the change of direction occurs. This means that the algorithm is not interleaving, a
contradiction.
Putting together the two properties stated above, the algorithm returns on the instance b a solution
comprising of at most 2 ⌈ln k⌉ agents from T , chosen among the ones with largest valuation. However, from
(14), this solution would be worse than returning S. Hence, from (13) it turns out that the optimal solution
would be T , and its welfare would be ρ times larger than that of returned solution.
5 Conclusions
OSP has attracted lots of interest in the computer science and economics communities, as witnessed by the
flurry of work on the topic (see overview in Appendix C). Our work can facilitate the study of this notion of
incentive-compatibility for imperfectly rational agents.
Just as the characterization of DAAs in terms of reverse greedy [25] has given the first extrinsic reason
to study the power and limitations of these algorithms [9, 16], we believe that our characterization of
OSP in terms of two-way greedy will lead to a better understanding of this algorithmic paradigm. In this
work, we only began to investigate their power and much more is left to be done. For example, different
optimization problems and objective functions (such as, min-max) could be considered. Moreover, whilst we
know that in general OSP mechanisms do not compose sequentially, see, e.g., [6], we could study under what
conditions two-way greedy algorithms compose, just like done for the composability of monotone algorithms
for strategyproofness [26].
The technical approach that we have used for our characterization of OSP goes beyond binary allocation
problems. Studying the relationship between non-negative short and negative longer cycles will shed light on
more general domains/problems, such as, scheduling with single-parameter agents [12]. The richer solution
space should yield a more intricate structure for negative-weight cycles and eventually lead to a charac-
terization of implementation trees (and, consequently, algorithms). Importantly, there is evidence that our
approach is also useful in the context of multi-parameter agents, as recently shown in [8] for unknown single-
minded combinatorial auctions (where bidders can lie about valuation and set of items they are willing the
buy). The extent to which this is true more in general is a valuable question to investigate.
The computational complexity of OSP mechanisms is another research direction worthy of mention.
The complexity of these mechanisms comes for their three components: algorithm (intuitively, the social
choice function run in the leaves of the implementation tree); protocol (i.e., the queries dictated by the
implementation tree); and, payments. We know that the algorithms run in time linear to the number of
agents, provided that the priority functions can be computed in constant time. This is indeed the case for
all the algorithms listed in Table 2. The execution protocol measures a sort of query complexity, which is
captured, by means of our characterization, by the sum of the agents’ domain sizes (the worst-case being
the instance in which each agent has type equal to the last query of the protocol). (Defining the entire
protocol might require longer; in principle, we might need the time to explicitly write down all priority
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functions used by the two-way greedy algorithm.) We believe that an interesting object of study here could
be the trade-off between query complexity and approximation guarantee of these mechanisms. Our payment
functions are implicitly defined through the cycle-monotonicity framework (as certain shortest paths in the
OSP-graphs, see [10]); this means that we need time proportional to the size of the OSP-graphs for their
computation. Another important problem left open by our work concerns in fact the definition of explicit
payments functions for the OSP implementation of two-way greedy algorithms. We give a taster of this
direction in Appendix B in the context of combinatorial auctions. Together with the impact upon the
mechanism running time, this kind of results would also make the meaning of the imperfect rationality
behind OSP – and, in turns, its notion of “simplicity” – more explicit.
A Postponed proofs
A.1 Proof of Observation 2
Proof. Let v a node of T where the domain of i = i(v) is partitioned into k > 2 parts P1, . . . , Pk, and let
T1, . . . , Tk be the corresponding subtrees rooted at the k children of v. We modify T locally to make it
binary in the following way. We substitute v with k− 1 new nodes, v(1), . . . , v(k−1), with i = i(v(j)) for each
v(j). At v(1) we ask agent i to separate P1 from P2 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk. The left child of v(1) is thus T1, and the right
child is v(2) where we iterate the same approach on P2 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk. More generally, at each node v(j), we ask
agent i to separate Pj from Pj+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk, the subtree rooted at the left child is Tj , while the right child
is v(j+1). It is not hard to see, by inspection, that these modifications do not alter the OSP constraints of
i at v in the original mechanism M ; similarly, we note that the OSP constraints defined by nodes different
from v are not modified. By reiterating the argument on all the v ∈ T with more than two children, we can
construct a binary tree T ′ that guarantees OSP and uses the same (f, p). This concludes the proof.
A.2 Local transformations
Suppose T contains a node u whose query to i = i(u) is not extremal, meaning that neither two subdomain
L(u) and R(u) is a singleton. Let TL(u) and TR(u) denote the subtrees rooted in the child of u reached through
the types in L(u) and R(u), respectively.
We define below a suitable local transformation that replace u with a sequences of nodes whose queries
are extremal and that satisfy these two conditions:
1. If the original mechanism satisfies OSP CMON for all agents j other than i, then so does the modified
mechanism;
2. If the original mechanism satisfies OSP 2CMON for agent i, then so does the modified mechanism.
This transformation proceeds as follows: Each node u in T is replaced by a sequence of nodes u(1), . . . , u(s),
with i(u) = i(u(1)) = · · · = i(u(s)) and each of them having two children; node u(h) with h < s has u(h+1) as
a child, and the other child is either
1. (L-sub.) A copy of TL(u) whose root we denote by ℓ(h). In this case we say that u(h) is a L-sub.
2. (R-sub.) A copy of TR(u) whose root we denote by r(h). In this case we say that u(h) is a R-sub.
Finally, the last node u(s) has as children a copy of TL(u) and a copy of TR(u) , thus it is both a L-sub and a
R-sub (with ℓ(s) and r(s) denoting the roots of these copies as above).
Our aim is to choose nodes and which child to assign to them so that the following property is satisfied.
Definition 9 (Well-Aligned Transformation). A local transformation is well aligned if( ⋃
u(h)is a R-sub
D
(r(h))
i
)
= R(u) and
( ⋃
u(h) is a L-sub
D
(ℓ(h))
i
)
= L(u),
It is not hard to see that, well aligned local transformations do not destroy OSP for the agents other
than i (Property 1). We next describe how our (well aligned) local transformation are implemented, and we
observe that OSP 2CMON of agent i is also preserved (Property 2).
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A.2.1 Local transformation for Homogeneous Case
We can now define T ′ through a local transformation of u where we sequentially ask top queries from
Q = R ∪ L(≥rmin). (Clearly, here we use TL or TR as children of the new nodes in T ′ depending on whether
the current maximum belongs to L(≥rmin) or R.) Observe that, by construction, OSP 2CMON is satisfied
for T ′, since we never add a negative-weight two-cycle.
A.2.2 Local transformation for Revealable Case
We consider the types in L in increasing order, that is, L = {l1 < l2 < · · · < lℓ} for ℓ = |L|. Then, we will
define a suitable local transformation which corresponds to a sequence of bottom queries about all types
in L. Specifically, we apply the following local transformation of node u defined by the sequence of nodes
u(1), . . . , u(ℓ) for ℓ = |L|. At u(q) we query i to distinguish between lq and the remaining higher possible
values in {lq+1, . . . , lℓ} ∪R. The child of u(q) associated to lq is TL, and the other child of u(q) is next node
u(q+1) of the transformation. Finally, the two children of last node u(ℓ) are TL for action corresponding
to lℓ (the maximum in L), and TR for the action corresponding to the types in R. We let T ′ denote the
tree obtained from T by applying this local transformation. Observe that, by construction, OSP 2CMON is
satisfied for T ′, since we never add a negative-weight two-cycle.
A.3 Proof of Observation 4
Proof. The proof discusses the case in which types are costs (but, as above, does not require assumptions
on their signs). Given an OSP extremal mechanism M in which agent i is revealable at node u, we denote
with L all types t ∈ D(u)i that are 1-always, and with R all the types that are 0-always.
We build the mechanism M ′ by modifying T to T ′ as follows. Assume first that there is type tˆ, which is
unclear. Note that since M is OSP 2CMON, then we have that maxL < tˆ < minR. We create d = |D(u)i |
copies of u ∈ T , denoted u1, . . . , ud, each rooting the subtree of T rooted at u. We also create d− 1 vertices
v1, . . . , vd−1 in T ′ where i(vj) = i for all j. At the vj ’s, we make a sequence of top queries about types in R,
then a sequence of bottom queries for the types in L. The children of each vj , j < d − 1, are the j-th copy
of u, uj, and vj+1. The children of vd−1 are ud−1 and ud, the last two copies of u. Note that the last query
for i at vd−1 will separate the maximum in L from tˆ. This query will not be needed if there is no unclear
type tˆ in D
(u)
i and therefore the number of u’s and v’s in T ′ will be reduced by one.
We now argue that M ′ is OSP CMON. By construction, the OSP-graphs OT ′j of each agent j 6= i have
less edges than OTj and it does not have negative-weight cycles since M is OSP. Let us then focus on agent
i and its OSP-graph OT ′i which has more edges than OTi . By construction, these new edges satisfy OSP
2CMON; assume by contradiction that OT ′i has a negative weight cycle C and let b(1),b(2),b(3) and b(4)
the profiles in C defined by Theorem 2. Recall that there must be no edge between b(2) and b(3) in OT ′i ,
where b
(2)
i < b
(3)
i and fi(b
(2)) = 0 and fi(b
(3)) = 1. It is not hard to see that there are no two values in D
(u)
i
that satisfy this condition — a contradiction.
B Payments of IAAs for Single-Minded CAs
In [25] it is observed how a particular immediate-acceptance auction based on the forward greedy algorithm,
inspired6 by [22], where bidders are ranked by their valuation (i.e., using the notation of Section 4, g
(in)
i (b) =
b, for all i ∈ N, b ∈ Di) is not group-strategyproof and hence not OSP. The immediate-acceptance auction
in [25] uses the threshold payment scheme: the winners are charged the minimal bids that would have
been accepted for the particular bid profile of the other bidders. We now show how Corollary 1 applies to
this setting for the very simple instance used by [25] — this illustrates how the payment scheme needs to
be built upon the implementation tree (rather than blindly use the SP payments for the direct-revelation
implementation).
6The algorithm in [22] uses a slightly more articulate priority function to return a better approximation of the optimal social
welfare; we here follow [25] and focus on the simpler greedy-by-valuation algorithm. It is shown in [8] how this algorithm can
be implemented in an OSP way for unknown single-minded bidders.
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Consider the following simple instance of single-minded CAs. We have three bidders: bidder 1 and bidder
2 want a different object each, whilst bidder 3 wants the bundle. Let the valuation domain of the bidders
be {tmin, tmed, tmax}, with tmin = 0 and 2tmed < tmax. Note that the threshold for bidder 1 and 2 for the bid
profile bmax = (tmax, tmax, tmax) is 0, as either bidder would win even by declaring tmin. (Here we can safely
assume that the algorithm prefers the two bidders; technically speaking, the threshold need not be 1-always
– cf. Definition 1.) Therefore, bidder 1 and 2 would find it beneficial to jointly misreport tmed to tmax when
bidder 3 bids tmax [25] as they would win the items for free (whilst they would lose the items if truthful).
How does Corollary 1 circumvent this problem? The implementation tree used by the IAA first queries
bidder 1 for tmax (and returns {1, 2} if yes) then bidder 2 for tmax (and again returns {1, 2} if yes) and finally
bidder 3 for tmax returning {3} if yes; the rest of the tree is immaterial for our purposes. (To break ties and
force this query ordering, we could simply modify the in-priority functions g
(in)
i ’s by adding an increasing
function of i−1.) It is not too hard to see that this implementation tree does not require the payment for
bidder 1 and 2 to be the same for the bid profile bmax. In fact, the only OSP-graph with edges from/to bmax
is bidder 1’s and so bidder 2’s payment for that bid profile is not constrained by OSP; in other words, bidder
2 is not concerned with the outcome of the auction for bmax when taking her decision about separating tmax
from the rest of her domain.
C Further Related Work
We will here focus only on the body of work on OSP. Since its inception [23], OSP has attracted the interest
of both computer scientists and economists. The authors of [3] study OSP for stable matchings and provide
an impossibility result in general as well as a suitable mechanism under some assumptions. The paper [6]
further studies this concept for a number of settings, including single-peaked domains. Further work on
OSP for single-peaked preferences is [1, 2]. In [28], the authors study OSP mechanisms in domains where
monetary transfers are not allowed and provide a useful characterization in this setting.
For the setting where money is permitted, OSP is investigated for machine scheduling and set system
problems in [10], published in [12, 11], where mechanisms are designed for “small” domains of up to three
values, the cycle-monotonicity technique is introduced and some lower bounds are provided. The authors of
[13] study OSP under a restriction on the agents’ behavior during the execution of the mechanism, called
monitoring. This is shown to help the design of OSP mechanisms with a good approximation ratio in
various mechanism design domains. The paper [20] builds forth on this by studying machine scheduling in
the absence of monetary payments and showing the power of OSP in this setting. Another paper which
focuses on machine scheduling is [15], where a generalization of OSP is studied that allows for some ability of
the agents to reason contingently (as opposed to none); the authors show that a large amount of “lookahead”-
ability is required for the agents in any mechanism that achieves a good approximation ratio. Another study
that considers OSP under a restriction on the agents’ behavior is [14], where the authors assume that non-
truthful behaviour can be detected and penalised with a certain probability. Under this assumption, the
authors prove that every social choice function can be implemented by an OSP mechanism with either very
large fines for lying or a large number of “verified” agents. A recent paper studies OSP for single-minded
combinatorial auctions [8]; the authors use the structural approach of negative long cycles we introduce
herein for the multidimensional setting of unknown single-minded bidders. In [24] a revelation principle is
presented that states that every social choice function implementable through an OSP mechanism can be
implemented using a certain structured OSP protocol where agents take turns making announcements about
their valuations. This informs our definition of extensive-form mechanisms and OSP.
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